Date: Sat, 01 Mar 1997 15:07:52 -0600
Subject: conscious versus purposeful action
I heard a fairly detailed report on some research conducted by some
psychologists to investigate the role of "hunches" and "feelings" in
decisionmaking. The bottom line was that the brain (or mind?) is working
actively behind an actor's conscious thought to solve problems. Has
anyone else heard about this research? Anyway, it prompted a question in
my mind, and that is, to what extent must a actor be conscious of a
"purpose" or object of a problem solving exercise and the
problem-solving processes themselves going on in his subconscious before
we can say it is part of purposeful action?
Mike Thomsen
Madison, Wisconsin
<mthomsen@itis.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 21:26:58 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Mike Thomsen,
Work from the field of cybernetics has convinced me that purposefulness is
a very basic systemic property within living things. Along this line I
assert that no consciousness whatsoever is required for behavior to be
purposeful. Indeed, properly understood, behavior is the label for what an
organism does as an expression of purpose in a context.
For economics, especially of an Austrian sort, the question is then how
'action' relates to behavior. As I wrote to this list awhile back I agree
with Mises that human action is qualitatively beyond mere behavior. I
disagree with any who claim the differentiation comes as a consequence of
consciousness, however.
Extending from Munz (_Philosophical Darwinism_, 1993) I propose that the
differentiator for human action is that it involves goals and
understandings which are the products of language: Human action is
purposefulness which is tightly tied up with intellectual conceptualization
(broadly construed).
I am confident that this assertion does not conflict with the Austrian view
requiring the premise of intentionality for economics, regarding which
Peter J. Boettke posted a concise statement last September 5:
The fact that Austrian economics does not in general adhere to tight
rational choice models or homo economicus, doesn't mean that it
doesn't rely on loose rational choice models -- purposive man. There
is a loose instrumental rationality that is the core of economic
analysis in Menger, Mises and Hayek. [... W]hile Hayek denied that
the logic of action was [] sufficient, he did not deny that it was a
necessary. The phrase is "of human action, but not of human design".
Human action is foundational. The way Austrian writers deal with
the way individuals arrange means to obtain ends is not trivialized
in terms of the problem situation, whereas it is within neoclassical
models.
By defining action as I do we may retain praxeology as a distinct science,
and continue to see economics as a sub-science within it, while exposing
that both of these lie very simply within the larger range of life
sciences. Surprisingly, by this view there turns out to be nothing which
distinguishes the *operation* of economic action from any other mode of
behavior, not even "instinctive" ones such as respiration. Indeed, there
are no modes of behavior whatsoever.
Sorting between economic action and reflex (and all similar categorization)
must turn on how purposes arise and prevail. In this regard the
productions which come from purposes (a.k.a. behaviors) are beside the
point, as are the side-effects of such products. Consciousness is one such
side-effect. Despite how fascinating we find it, its presence and abscence
does not qualify anything important for economics. We would do well not to
be distracted by consciousness, as neither the basic nature of purpose nor
the key ideas involved in economic calculation are functions of it.
Tracy Bruce Harms
harms@hackvan.com
===========================================================================
>I heard a fairly detailed report on some research conducted by some
>psychologists to investigate the role of "hunches" and "feelings" in
>decisionmaking. The bottom line was that the brain (or mind?) is working
>actively behind an actor's conscious thought to solve problems. Has
>anyone else heard about this research? Anyway, it prompted a question in
>my mind, and that is, to what extent must a actor be conscious of a
>"purpose" or object of a problem solving exercise and the
>problem-solving processes themselves going on in his subconscious before
>we can say it is part of purposeful action?
>
>Mike Thomsen
>Madison, Wisconsin
><mthomsen@itis.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 12:20:12 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
I would say that Mises claim that the distinction between
consciousness and unconsciousness is nonetheless sharp and can
be clearly determined is a claim not to be taken seriously.
I challenge anyone who finds Mises articulations of 'human action'
or 'praxeology' persuasive to read a bit of Wittgenstein on
psychology and the various language of mental states & doings.
I is hard for me to imagine that anyone who will take the time to
do so will fail to see the brittleness & logical failure of
much of Mises' taxonomy. After than read some of the experimental
work in psychology -- this to will explode the simplicisty of
the Mises picture, e.g. on the so-called 'clearly determined'
distinctions between consciousness and unconsciousness. Mises is
working with a rather primative Freudian picture that is
seriously outdated in many regards. Our language and out human
experience provides a distinction between consciousness and
unconsciousness -- but as with most distinctions there is an
area of penumbra here -- and areas were the distinction falls apart.
Experimental psychology has revealed many areas where we simply
don't know what word to use -- and we must lay down new conventions
for the appropriate use of these terms.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Sun, 02 Mar 1997 04:58:15 +0800
From: Patrick Gunning <gunning@stsvr.showtower.com.tw>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
GREG RANSOM wrote:
> I challenge anyone who finds Mises articulations of 'human action'
> or 'praxeology' persuasive to read a bit of Wittgenstein on
> psychology and the various language of mental states & doings.
> I is hard for me to imagine that anyone who will take the time to
> do so will fail to see the brittleness & logical failure of
> much of Mises' taxonomy.
Greg, could you give us a more specific reference? I have, by the way,
read a great deal of psychology and I can provide you with references to
widely respected psychologists who have accepted the distinction between
conscious and subconscious, although none would say that it can be
demonstrated experimentally or empirically.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 13:26:31 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
It is a mistake to think i denign that we make and there is
a distinction to be made between a wink and a blink -- i.e.
a conscious and an unconscious human doing. What i challenge is
Mises reification of this distinction in a 'conceptual
analysis' -- and his imposition of this 'scientistic' or
'constructivistic' conceptual construction on all human doings,
including all of those within a context of getting on with
our lives. I think this reification is a falsification, a confusion
and a mistake generated by a fallacious philosophy & misunder-
standing of knowledge & science. It is as much of a mistake as
any other of the 'conceptual analysis' that were baked up in Vienna
during the 1920's & 1930's.
Wittgenstein's _The Blue and The Brown Book_, his _Philosophical
Investigations_, and several of his collected manuscripts and lectures
on psychology are all recommended. Note esp. Wittgenstein's
account of what it is to expect someone's arrival. Wittgenstein's
account is a devistating undermining of 'mental state' & logical
construction pictures of 'expectations' - exposing the fallaciousness
of the reification and 'conceptual analysis' strategy used to
account for the mental.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 15:53:22 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
I'm happy to relate my previous post to Pat Gunning's discussion of
consciousness. I've been thinking that I should, additionally, summarize
the main thrust of my post in more simple terms.
Pat Gunning raises the question: In what way is the term "consciousness"
relevant to praxeology and, therefore, to economics? My position is that
consciousness has at most an incidental relevance to praxeology. This is
counterintuitive because consciousness is a natural part of our experience
of decion-making.
Pat also asks: Can praxeology do without the distinction between
willfully-caused and unchosen/unwillful behavior? This actually boils down
to the question of how to demarcate praxeology. We have the suspicion that
praxeology should stand as a special science, that there is something
somehow special which occurs with human action which is not a consideration
for explaining non-human action. But in this regard I wish to recall Greg
Ransom's indication of a turn away from a certain approach to
classification, as posted to this group February 9th:
Defining 'science' and its domains in terms of subject matter
and methods, Mises attempts to construct a 'science of
man' ala Weber and aiming to satisfy the epistomological demands
of Aristotle and his modern heirs. Rejecting this picture,
Hayek re-constructs economics in terms of empirical problems that
market phenomena generated in our experience
What I have in mind is a similarly Hayekian transformation for praxeology.
Just as economics is an exploration of the problems which arise from market
phenomena, praxeology is better seen as an exploration of the problems
which arise from the presence and consequences of concepts. Market
phenomena arise with and through concepts such as property, money,
transaction, and price. The wider range of concepts -- what Popper calls
'world 3' -- engender a wider range of problems. Here lies the stuff of
praxeology.
The first major fruit of this turn is that it puts an end to definitional
wranglings such as "what is will?" "what is purpose?" or "what is
consciousness?" We *need not* distinguish between intended and unintended
behavior. This is important because in fact we *cannot* succeed in such an
attempt. As I meant when I wrote "there are no modes of behavior," we
cannot fruitfully sort *types* of behavior. The only reasonable sorting
among behaviors occurs by identifying the specific purposes they serve, but
often enough those are obscure. Obscure or not, behavior is intractibly
tied with purpose. Mises runs afoul in his attempt to appropriate purpose
to human action alone, to segregate it from the "merely" animal. I am
unsure to what degree Hayek also makes this error, but I suspect it is
present at some point. This is in fact one of the most widespread errors
of all theory. For a corrective away from this error I recommend William
T. Powers' _Behavior: The Control of Perception_ (1973).
This error is glaring in the sentence Pat Gunning quoted:
>Mises, 1966, p. 11 says:
>"Conscious or purposeful behavior is in sharp contrast to unconscious
>behavior, i.e., the reflexes and the involuntary responses of the body's
>cells and nerves to stimuli."
Ransom is correct that the distinction between conscious and unconscious is
nowhere near so sharp as Mises claimed. But that is beside the point. The
more important fact is that behavior cannot *ever* be understood as
responses to stimuli. (See Powers.) Thus even if consciousness were
always unambiguously distinct it would not let us segregate purpose from
non-purpose. The idea that consciousness is the source or hallmark of
purpose is flatly WRONG. Attempts to salvage that presumption will fail
and will drag every associated effort into a mire.
Either praxeology will do without the distinction between behavior which
involves purpose and that which does not, or praxeology will be but another
antique in the trashpile. The notion of behavior without purpose is as
bankrupt as the notion of observation without an observer.
Pat Gunning writes:
>If we adopt Mises's method of dealing with such issues, we would begin
>by asking whether it is possible to imagine a distinctly human actor
>for whom the conscious-unconscious distinction is not relevant. If so,
>then praxeology can do without it.
This is agreeable to me. Consider this: The task of envisioning a human
actor for whom the distinction is not relevant need not involve the
presumption that the distinction does not *exist*. Indeed, consciousness
might do more than exist, it might well be useful and indeed important, and
still not be *definitive*. The relevance Mises expected of it was a
definitive relevance; I grant it no more than an instrumental relevance.
Praxeological thinking reformed in this direction expects that consiousness
plays a part in action, but it does not turn attention to consiousness, per
se, as a criterion for any categorization. Consciousness is tangental to
praxeological explanation.
Obviously much more deserves discussion, but best to post this as is for
now. I still need to write a simplified restatement, but hopefully this
makes at least some of the idea a bit more plain.
Tracy Bruce Harms
harms@hackvan.com
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 07:14:23 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
On Mon, 3 Mar 1997, John Cobin wrote:
> reflection is what sets us apart from animals;
One constantly reads such propositions about reason, reflection,
awareness, etc., that sets human beings apart from other animals.
But this is always asserted without warrants.
So I ask, "how do you know?"
It is sufficient for social science theory to set premises about persons,
which encompass some human beings, without adding the proposition that
only human beings are persons. Heck, some human beings may not be
persons either, such as the permanently unconscious or zygotes.
Fred Foldvary
Date: Mon, 03 Mar 1997 17:53:01 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Fred:
I hope one of our philosophers like Harns or Ransom has a better answer
than mine for this.
> So I ask, "how do you know?"
It is certainly true that animals have some ability to remember things
-- some extremely well. However, these are simply used to make their
existence more efficient. Animals do not ponder reality present based
on what they know about the past in order to change. In this sense,
they do not reflect. Reflection is a uniquely human phenomenon.
> Heck, some human beings may not be
> persons either, such as the permanently unconscious or zygotes.
Levels of development are not a measure of humanity. A one or even a
two year old can not care for himself with his level of development,
much more than a zygote can, yet that does not means that he is not
human. Indeed, all of them are. Reflection likewise is subject to
development, but the human condition warrants that it will normally
develop -- at least there is some expectation that it will 99.999% of
the time -- to varying degrees in each person. Humans are characterized
in this manner: that they generally develop a capacity to reflect. We
cannot say that about animals.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 14:27:59 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
There is some evidence of parts of the domain
for which we use the word 'reflection' exhibited
by at least 2 or 3 of the higher primates
other than man, and perhaps among elephants. Only
through a mistaken reification of 'Platonization'
of the use of language into 'essences' can we be mislead
into searching for psychological 'essential'
characteristics of man. Since the work of Darwin &
Wittgenstein would should have given up the folly
of this sort of Aristotelian project.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 14:38:23 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
A nice reality check for folks looking for human
'essences', esp. psychological ones, is Donald Griffin's
book, _Animal Minds_, Chicago: Chicago U. Press,
1992. I might also recommend some of the works of
Rosenberg and Popper on the notions of 'human nature'
or the explanatory strategy of 'essentialism', e.g.
Rosenberg's _Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social
Science_ or Popper's _The Poverty of Historicism_.
A look at some of the work of Edelman, Wittgenstein,
and Hayek might also be recommended. Of closely related
interest is John Bonner, _The Evolution of Culture in Animals_.
Jane Goodal has also written some book on the subject
of the mental life of higher primates which anyone thinking
about the subject should be familiar with. It's time
everyone moved into the late 20th century (and almost the
21st!) on this topic .. leaving the ancient notion of
the Greeks about 'human essenses' to the past, and similarly
so the 19th century incarnations of these ancient ideas.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
From: ETCHISON.GC@EMAIL.PUC.TEXAS.GOV (GC-Etchison, Michael)
Date: Mon, 03 Mar 1997 17:09 CST
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Re: Greg Ransom's drum-thumping for purely material evolution and
anti-Aristotelian (or was it anti-Platonic?) Science:
The rhetorical strategy -- sweep away all possible dissidence by loudly
invoking the Ineffable Name of Science, so that any obstruction is
unmistakably Not Worthy of Notice -- is charming, in its way. But, alas,
there is some small sign that the tide might be turning. Anyway, for a
less-than-reverential look at the neo-hyper-Darwinist mode of thinking
about Man, take a peek into Darwin's Black Box (the book by Michael Behe,
that is).
Michael Etchison
[taking no sides]
[and not just because it's hard to see what difference it makes to the
doing of economics]
[opinions mine, not the PUCT's]
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 15:51:02 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Actually Michael the core thrust of what i think
wrong with 'essentialism', esp. psychologistic essentialism
about man, comes from Wittgenstein and a simple
accumulation of experience with animal species other
than our own. This is not Darwinian science, this is rather
an improved understanding of language, logic, and of the
other organisms we share the earth with, available to even
anti-Darwinists (such as Wittgenstein seems to have
been, not at all typical of folks who learned what little
than new of biology prior to the modern neo-Darwinian
synthesis). The arguments of Popper are also little dependent
on an understanding of Darwinian biology (and a good thing
too, because Popper shows little sign of having understood Darwinian
theory).
Rosenberg, by contrast, does bring in some of the modern facts
we have learned from the Darwinian biologists, along with much of
what we know understand through the conceptual revolution of
the Darwinian explanatory stratgy. On all this i might also highly
recommend the essays in David Hull's outstanding _The Metaphysics
of Darwinism_, esp. his essays there on Aristotle and the 'nature' of
man. See also several of the book of Ernst Mayr which touch on
these topics, esp. his _The Growth of Biological Thought_. Both Mayr
and Hull reject much of what has been called Rosenberg's 'dogmatic
empiricism & materialism', i.e. much of Rosenberg's rather dated work
in the tradition of Mill, Hume, and Locke. A Darwinist does not
have to be a materialist or empiricist in the sense of 18th century
thinkers.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 16:11:15 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
On Mon, 3 Mar 1997, John Cobin wrote:
> It is certainly true that animals have some ability to remember things
> -- some extremely well. However, these are simply used to make their
> existence more efficient.
How is this assertion warranted?
> Animals do not ponder reality present based
> on what they know about the past in order to change.
What's the evidence?
> In this sense,
> they do not reflect. Reflection is a uniquely human phenomenon.
Again, John, you assert this, but provide no warrants, i.e.
no evidence or argument to justify it.
> > Heck, some human beings may not be
> > persons either, such as the permanently unconscious or zygotes.
>
> Levels of development are not a measure of humanity.
Agreed; but my statement above refers to personhood, not humanity.
Fred Foldvary
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 10:14:23 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
It seems to me that one item that needs to be clarified in this thread
is whether the discussion is (1) a philosophical one about the nature of
humanness, (2) a biological one about how we should classify the forms
of what we define as life, or (3) an epistemological one about the tools
one needs in order to deal with distinctly economic problems.
Without claiming that these three are necessarily unrelated, I think
that we might avoid a lot of confusion if the submitter of a post stated
at the outset which of these issues he was concerned with. Perhaps my
viewpoint on the issue is already known. I favor dealing with (3). By
distinctly economic problems, I refer to the problems raised by those
who claim that ordinary people, by their own judgment, would be better
off either (1) without private property rights and the freedom to
exchange (i.e., without the conditions of the market economy) or (2) by
using the coercive force that is necessary to enforce these rights for
some other purpose than that of establishing a market economy. Given
this inclination, it seems to me that before we can deal with the issues
that some contributors to this thread seem to regard as most
fundamental, it would be desirable to try to characterize the "action"
or "behavior" that is most relevant to understanding the outcome of (1)
interaction under the conditions of the market economy and (2) market
intervention. Are the notions of "conscious," "purposeful," action, etc.
relevant to the goal of understanding market phenomena and the effects
of market intervention?
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 10:09:08 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Pat:
Your categories may be useful although they might also be blurred a bit,
especially (1) and (3).
After all, Mises does not make such a distinction in HA as you would
have liked, and it is possible that he meant more than just category
(3). Is it possible that in order to deal with this question that at
least both (1) and (3) must be addressed, and that maybe (2) becomes
unavoidable at some point?
> that we might avoid a lot of confusion if the submitter of a post stated
> at the outset which of these issues he was concerned with. Perhaps my
May I suggest that we clarify from the outset what Mises meant? That
would do well to focus our thinking in an Austrian forum.
> fundamental, it would be desirable to try to characterize the "action"
>or "behavior" that is most relevant to understanding the outcome of (1)
> interaction under the conditions of the market economy and (2) market
>intervention.Are the notions of "conscious," "purposeful," action, etc.
> relevant to the goal of understanding market phenomena and the effects
> of market intervention?
The issue of liberty is essential for sure. But tell me, who should
have liberty: humans or persons or both? If a human is unconscious or
undeveloped should he have that liberty? If animals can reflect and act
purposefully should they have liberty? How do we test for a minimum
level of reflection and purposefulness in order to emancipate those most
advanced? Fundamentally, we need to determine who can reflect or act
purosefully before we can proceed with further enonomic inquiry. Before
this thread, that question had an obvious answer for me. Now I am
challenged to see if Greg and Fred can come up a credible alternative
hypothesis.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 09:52:56 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Fred:
> > It is certainly true that animals have some ability to remember things
> > -- some extremely well. However, these are simply used to make their
> > existence more efficient.
>
> How is this assertion warranted?
I can only assert based on my common sense observations and some
undergrad philosophy class I had 15 years ago. So I may be wrong. I
certainly do not pretend to be able to quote the littany that Ransom
can. But this is email so I might as well add a few things especially
since they make sense to me and it is likely a worthwhile discussion.
(I might add that Ransom's last comments I found less than persuasive.
Citing book titles doesn't do it for me.)
Well, the animals "learn" that certain forms of activity cause them
greater pain when practiced (e.g., dog wetting the rug gets spanked, cow
hitting electric fence gets shocked). While the animals remember these
things to make their lives more efficient, it is not a form of
reflection. Maybe Greg does have some primates that reflect, but
frankly that proposition seems very doubtful to me. Can animals really
do what men do when they reflect? To some extent that is an empirical
question and might depend on definitions.
> > Animals do not ponder reality present based
> > on what they know about the past in order to change.
>
> What's the evidence?
I have none. I have never looked for any via a scientific test either.
Do you have evidence to believe that animals do act this way? Or do you
think it is reasonable or fair to assume that they do?
> > In this sense,
> > they do not reflect. Reflection is a uniquely human phenomenon.
>
> Again, John, you assert this, but provide no warrants, i.e.
> no evidence or argument to justify it.
Conceded. I am recalling from the past something I was taught. Now my
question is, if there is no evidence for this then why do some
philosophers teach this stuff? Is their claim baseless? Is it
reasonable to assume that they have some basis for their theory? Maybe
or maybe not. I have no way to justify it and really no desire to do so
(other than via my observations noted above I suppose).
So now Fred, I am all ears. Tell me your theory and don't just be a
doubting Thomas. Let's see the facts. Or let's permit the pure
philosophers among us to get the ball rolling. (1) Is there evidence
that aver reflection extends beyond humans (that is believable anyway)
and (2)Is there purposeful action that is not human action?
>
> > > Heck, some human beings may not be
> > > persons either, such as the permanently unconscious or zygotes.
> >
> > Levels of development are not a measure of humanity.
>
> Agreed; but my statement above refers to personhood, not humanity.
Please clarify. Are you saying that a one year old is a human but not a
person? A zygote? The level of development does not affect personhood
either.
Normally, "person" is a legal term that is used to signify a human who
has natural rights that are recognized in law. I realize this is only
one way that the word can be used but it seems to be a legitimate use
for some purposes anyway. For instance, slaves in the last century were
humans but not persons in law, that is they had no right to liberty and
property, and an abridged right to life. Such a distinction was
normally made according to physical characteristics (black skin,
Chinese). Now indeed we can say that they really had those rights but
others prohibited them from exercising them. The point is that *legally*
they had not standing as persons. If you beat a slave you likely had no
penalty but if you beat a non-slave there was a penalty, and so forth.
You might declare that a zygote, a moron, or even a one year old is not
a person based on some physical or developmental characteristic, but
this could only be in some legal sense. I will contend that they are
both humans and persons.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 08:33:46 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
On Tue, 4 Mar 1997, John Cobin wrote:
> > > Animals do not ponder reality present based
> > > on what they know about the past in order to change.
> >
> > What's the evidence?
>
> I have none. I have never looked for any via a scientific test either.
> Do you have evidence to believe that animals do act this way? Or do you
> think it is reasonable or fair to assume that they do?
I was only asking for the warrants for your assertions.
Now my request for warrants has been challenged at its roots.
I'll be very interested in finding the lack of warrant in calling
for warranting, indeed. At any rate,
I am not making any propositions about non-human animals here,
hence I need no evidence.
It is not evident or obvious to me from casual observation
that animals do not reflect or ponder reality. The fact that
dolphins seem to have an affinity to human beings and have
helped them and not normally harmed them opens some questions.
> > > In this sense,
> > > they do not reflect. Reflection is a uniquely human phenomenon.
> >
> > Again, John, you assert this, but provide no warrants, i.e.
> > no evidence or argument to justify it.
>
> Conceded. I am recalling from the past something I was taught. Now my
> question is, if there is no evidence for this then why do some
> philosophers teach this stuff?
They, not the animals, have failed to reflect.
> Is their claim baseless?
It lacks evidence.
But now I am told that evidence is not a scientific warrant!
I'm willing to have my head turned upside down, but it will require
a good argument - first as to how to do science in the first place.
> So now Fred, I am all ears. Tell me your theory and don't just be a
> doubting Thomas.
But I *was* just being a doubting Thomas.
I have no theory, but only a proposition, that there is a threshold
beyond which the set of phenomena called {reflection, reason,
awareness, pensience, sentience, etc.} endows a living being with
qualities that make it a person, a being that basis its action
on purposeful choice (if that antiquated notion still makes sense).
As to what species fit the criteria for personhood, I have no
special knowledge; I only ask for warrants for those who claim
that non-human beings do not fit the criteria.
> > > > Heck, some human beings may not be
> > > > persons either, such as the permanently unconscious or zygotes.
> > >
> > > Levels of development are not a measure of humanity.
> >
> > Agreed; but my statement above refers to personhood, not humanity.
>
> Please clarify. Are you saying that a one year old is a human but not a
> person? A zygote? The level of development does not affect personhood
> either.
I think it is reasonable to define as one criterion for personhood
the existence of a functioning mind. In that case, a one-year-old
human being is a person, but not a zygote. So the level of development
does affect personhood; a person can also change into a non-person.
> Normally, "person" is a legal term that is used to signify a human who
> has natural rights that are recognized in law.
So normally, law does recognize that we have natural rights?
Is this a standard, common belief among legal scholars?
> You might declare that a zygote, a moron, or even a one year old is not
> a person based on some physical or developmental characteristic, but
> this could only be in some legal sense. I will contend that they are
> both humans and persons.
>
It is not a matter of declaring, but determining the meaning of
concepts, and crafting definitions to fit those meanings, and
then seeing what items fit the definitions.
First we need to determine what personhood means.
This is important for economics, since the class of agents
studied consists of persons.
Fred Foldvary
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 18:00:39 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Fred:
> I am not making any propositions about non-human animals here,
> hence I need no evidence.
So then you will not contend that animals can reflect? You will be
agnostic on this point? You point is just that we cannot say because we
cannot know?
> It is not evident or obvious to me from casual observation
> that animals do not reflect or ponder reality. The fact that
> dolphins seem to have an affinity to human beings and have
> helped them and not normally harmed them opens some questions.
Have you been watching those Jaques Cousteau nature shows lately? Dogs
interact with humans too. So do all animals at some level. The fact
that some show "affinity" hardly means much does it? Is that how you
want to judge whether an animal can reflect?
> They, not the animals, have failed to reflect.
This is a little funny but very doubtful to me. You have just tried to
overturn a widespread belief with a joke. They are scholars, and the
least we can do until we see evidence to the contrary is to believe that
they have some logical or empirical rationale backing their statements.
> I'm willing to have my head turned upside down, but it will require
> a good argument - first as to how to do science in the first place.
Science is not just empirical studies Fred, and I think you don't need
me to tell you that. We can even use absurd assumptions to make little
models if they help us learn something or best explain and predict
something in the real world. It all can be science.
> I have no theory, but only a proposition, that there is a threshold
> beyond which the set of phenomena called {reflection, reason,
> awareness, pensience, sentience, etc.} endows a living being with
> qualities that make it a person, a being that basis its action
Well, propositions or hypotheses usually start with some observation or
point of reflection that makes you question something. So what is it
that generated your proposition? Have you evidence of animals
reflecting or do you have some theory that you have been thinking of
that led you to believe such a thing? Are you just doubting for the
sake of doubting? If you have no good reason to reject the theories on
reflection then why not accept them like we do for so many other things
in life?
> I think it is reasonable to define as one criterion for personhood
> the existence of a functioning mind. In that case, a one-year-old
> human being is a person, but not a zygote. So the level of
I don't think this is very "reasonable" unless *I* get to set the
standard for what is the mening of "the existence of a functioning
mind". This is a subjective thing. Statist idealogues would have liked
to take away personhood from retarded people, embryos, terminally
(mentally) ill, etc. Furthermore, let's consider a newborn, say 1
minute old. Does he/she have "the existence of a functioning mind" more
than he/she did 2 minutes ago? I think not. So your arbitrary
distinction is not very credible.
Moreover, does a newborn display "purposeful" human action and things
like the capacity to reflect in sufficient measure (1) to be considered
objects for economic analysis and (2) a person? Would you say that a
dolphin displays more affinity than a newborn?
Your measure is very dubious and arbitrary.
> > has natural rights that are recognized in law.
>
> So normally, law does recognize that we have natural rights?
> Is this a standard, common belief among legal scholars?
Is there a "normal" in law? In a Hayekian sense marginal change is
normal. Comparatively, law is very mutable and capricious across
cultures, epecially those characterized by Mises as displaying
"predatory militarism" (HA, 499-500). But there is some common respect
for life among most people, and to a lesser extent for property and
liberty, that permits societies to function. Of course governments
typically stand in oppostion to natural rights of individuals, but we
must not confound law, which is a market outcome of a social process,
with governments and their legislation.
> It is not a matter of declaring, but determining the meaning of
> concepts, and crafting definitions to fit those meanings, and
> then seeing what items fit the definitions.
Sure, but you have not clarified anything. Just the opposite; and your
statements read more like declarations than determinations from reason.
> First we need to determine what personhood means.
> This is important for economics, since the class of agents
> studied consists of persons.
OK. From my perspective, all humans are persons and no animals are
persons. The essential quality of pesonage is the ability to reflect or
the potential to develop the ability to reflect (even when unlikely due
to a disability) or being someone who used to be able to reflect. This
is often but not always reflected in language. Legal ideas of what
persons are is irrelevant for economics, and we must not arbitrarily
judge certain humans to be non-persons based on subjective criteria like
levels of "affinity" toward humans or somebody's opinion about "the
existence of a functioning mind".
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 18:20:47 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
Subject: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
This discussion seems to be bordering on a food-fight, guys. <g>
John Cobin, I enjoyed your directing attention to the ability to reflect.
I agree that what we've learned to call "human action" could not be
isolated from the capacity to reflect. You write: "It seems to me that
while consciousness is not the focal point as you said, reflection might be
the central feature." This may fine and dandy so long as we keep a couple
of things in mind. First, that we would invite the same problem we found
with consciousness if we attempt to qualify *specific modes of mind or
body* as reflection or reflective. (Here applies Greg's call for avoiding
the temptation of essentialist reification.) Second, that this talk of
reflection is primarily a change of labels. I happen to *like* the change;
the all-so-Austrian phrase "human action" doesn't travel well beyond the
ghetto. But speaking of reflection leaves unexplained what makes
reflection special.
Fred Foldvary, I entirely agree that "It is sufficient for social science
theory to set premises about persons, which encompass some human beings,
without adding the proposition that only human beings are persons." The
thing we're interested in here is orthogonal to questions of species.
However, I must warn that the matter under discussion does not
automatically carry over into ethics.
I'm probably not the only one who sees resumed in this discussion a
particular morality dispute between Fred and John. On that matter I just
want to say that matters of ethics (such as rights) are not mechanical
consequences of resolving questions such as reflective intentionality,
although it is likewise easy to understand why no faction wants to let
another seize what might serve as a moral high ground. Please, let none of
us be too quick in extending any of these ideas, without critical
examination, into policy conclusions.
Michael Etchison, I'm glad you announced that "it's hard to see what
difference it makes to the doing of economics." I will attempt to address
that more explicitly, soon, and hope I'm not alone in doing so.
But I do hope you'll take a bit more thoughtful patience with the ways of
thinking Greg has been pointing us to. Unstudied dismissals of these ideas
are, after all, precisely the sort of things which drives Mr. Ransom to the
limits of his temper. From my own intellectual past I would like to
volunteer that there really is a very different theoretical framework here,
and not only is it an impressive improvement, it is damn difficult to
learn. (I tend to think of myself as retarded for having floundered for so
many years in pursuit of pipe-dreams such as ontological axioms and
categorical absolutes. Then again, having pushed so hard for those things
may have earned me a stronger understanding of their inadequacy.)
One thing which makes Austrian economics so compelling to me (and, I
suspect, to Greg) is that it provides something of a microcosm of the
tension between frameworks just spoken of. It is important to not
overemphasize this tension, and I appreciate the work of scholars such as
Boettke and Cubeddu who have identified important continuities across the
Austrian field. Yet to my mind the watershed between foundationalism and
fallibilism is of vital importance, and the fact that Austrian advocates
are self-consciously arrayed on both sides of this divide make things
extraordinarily interesting.
So I naturally conclude with an expression of dismay over Fred's demands
for positive reasons: "How is this assertion warranted?" ... "What's the
evidence?" ... "Again, John, you assert this, but provide no warrants,
i.e. no evidence or argument to justify it." Fred, you and I are
diametrically opposed on this one. None of these things are necessary in
proposing or defending any theory. For today I make no effort to do more
than note the difference; I merely want everybody to see that this dispute
looms large again and again.
Undoubtedly the divergence between Mises and Hayek has been overplayed in
the soap-opera aspects of foundations, fundings, and academic departments;
undoubtedly the coherence between their work is not to be forgotten.
Nevertheless, the disagreement in question will not be successfully swept
under the rug. This dispute is, in fact, a big deal, and although it is
philosophical in its breadth, it is directly applicable to economics.
Mises and Hayek were in full agreement that answers in philosophy shape
questions in economics.
Tracy Bruce Harms
harms@hackvan.com
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 20:20:54 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: RE: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
I want to second Tracy's endorsement of the utility of the
notion of 'reflection', and i'd like to apologize if in my directness
is appear to have displayed bad temper .. really i was only being
very quick & to the point, not taking the time to sugercoat my
perspective on the matter of 'essentialism'. In fact, i have introduced
the distinction of deliberative and non-deliberative choice borrowed
from Larry Wright, and judging from some recent work in Austrian economics
this vocabulary and distinction seems to be gaining some legs. (Larry
Wright, "Argument and Deliberation: A Plea for Understanding", _J. of
Philosophy_, Nov. 1995, pp. 565-585.) My own plea is that these sorts of
important insights into useful distinctions not be reified into
essentialistic notions, e.g. such as giving some sort of conceptual
analysis of 'the human', ala Aristotle -- this way leads us backwards
and not forwards, it is both bad logic & bad science, and it is not
required by economics, pace what Mises sometimes seems to imply (although
Mises manages to say so much in so many ways it is hard to definitively
pin him down).
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 21:57:49 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
Subject: RE: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
Let me hereby apologize for volunteering comments which indicated that Greg
was ill-tempered when in fact he was not. I suppose I partly had in mind
the paragraph Greg wrote in September in a message entitled "Darwin,
natural selection, evolution", which bears repeating:
>As a public service, I'd like to recommend some books
>and articles on Darwin, selection, and evolution.
>I do this out of frustration with the low-grade quality
>of discussions of 'evolution' when the topic turns to
>economics, or the work of Friedrich Hayek. The level of
>'evolutionary' argument in the social sciences is so
>bad so often, and especially in the context of the discussion
>of the work of Hayek, that I constantly find myself wanting
>to throw books out the window, out of sheer bewilderment and
>utter frustration with argumentative and intellectual nonsense.
Your exasperation is not a fault, Greg.
Also, I look forward to looking into Michael Behe's book. My thanks to
Michael Etchison for bringing it to our attention.
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 10:33:25 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
Tracy:
A very thoughful reply and I especially appreciate the reminder that
economics must be informed by philosophy. Austrians above all
economists should be aware of this fact. I also appreciate the warning
against crass empiricism or positivistic demands that you sensed in
Fred's comments.
> This discussion seems to be bordering on a food-fight, guys. <g>
> I'm probably not the only one who sees resumed in this discussion a
> particular morality dispute between Fred and John. On that matter I
I'm not sure what Fred thinks or what Tracy means exactly, but I am not
aware of a "morality dispute" between Fred and I nor is it a "food
fight" in my view. The fact of the matter is that I kind of like Fred;
he is an interesting person to talk to.
> isolated from the capacity to reflect. You write: "It seems to me that
> while consciousness is not the focal point as you said, reflection might be
> the central feature." This may fine and dandy so long as we keep a couple
> of things in mind. First, that we would invite the same problem we found
> with consciousness if we attempt to qualify *specific modes of mind or
> body* as reflection or reflective. (Here applies Greg's call for avoiding
> the temptation of essentialist reification.) Second, that this talk of
> reflection is primarily a change of labels. I happen to *like* the change;
> the all-so-Austrian phrase "human action" doesn't travel well beyond the
> ghetto. But speaking of reflection leaves unexplained what makes
> reflection special.
OK, I concur with this thinking so then what route do we take to figure
it out? Or is it too big for us to do?
> want to say that matters of ethics (such as rights) are not mechanical
> consequences of resolving questions such as reflective intentionality,
> although it is likewise easy to understand why no faction wants to let
> another seize what might serve as a moral high ground.
Indeed, these questions are fundamental to our quest it seems to me. We
must have some resolve on what purposeful action is and who or what can
do it. Then we can address issues of liberty like Pat suggests. We
have to know something about "reflective intentionality" first, or at
least accept an assumption about it or maybe pursue dual paradigms based
on two different assumptions.
> are self-consciously arrayed on both sides of this divide make things
> extraordinarily interesting.
Indeed!
> So I naturally conclude with an expression of dismay over Fred's demands
> for positive reasons: "How is this assertion warranted?" ... "What's
Yeah, a lot of economics is empirically based but there is no reason to
say that we cannot argue philosophical assertions with logic to hone the
core of economic theory. Fred, you might have one a bit overboard on
this one.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 10:39:39 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Let me just say quickly that i don't view conversation as
solely concerned with persuasion -- persuasion is one of the
rarer froms of converstation. Most conversation is simply
informative -- or points others to alternative perspectives if
they have any interest.
Outside the primates there is a great deal to suggest
that elephants are reflective in a whole variety of different
ways in which we use this word. There was a recent book
on this subject (which I have only flipped through) .. but
this evidence has been widely reported on PBS type programs on
the elephants of africa.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 18:14:05 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Greg:
Are you saying then that reflection that leads to persausion is
different than reflection that only leads to conversation (information)
and that the former exists in humans and the latter in both humans and
animals? Plus that only the former can be used as a dividing point for
determining who are the proper economic actors?
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 10:45:53 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
John writes "we need to determine who can reflect or
act purposefully before we can proceed with further economic
inquiry". This is true only due to the fact that Mises
has confused the explanatory problem of economics under the
influence of Weber's confused idea of a 'science of man'
or a 'science of action'. If you look like Hayek & Menger &
Smith & Hume instead at a problem raising in our experience
found in undesigned social order, the need to uses essentialistic/
Aristotilean criteria to define 'man' or 'action' falls away --
and along with it a lot of philosophical baggage that looks like
bad logic and science from the perspective of developments in
these fields over the last 200 years (e.g. Darwin & Wittgenstein,
among others).
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 18:07:33 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Greg:
I respect this point you make.
However, let's consider further that this issue of Mises is not
tangential. I might be willing to assert, upon further reflection, that
the entire Misesian argument rests on the action axiom as it stands. By
modifying it as you would have us do you might as well toss Austrian
economics. Maybe that is what is needed.
Alternatively, we might toss more modern advances in favor of Weberian
'science of man' or a 'science of action'.
A third alternative, which suits me best, is to find some commonality
between them and keep Misesian language while modifying its
interpretation somewhat, which is precisely the objective of this
thread. Ideally, we can throw out the "baggage" of the last 200 years
along the way. Conformity to the status quo is not necessarily an
advance so we need to always be self-critical in our analysis as you
well know.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 1997 14:35:37 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
John Cobin wrote:
>
> Pat:
>
> If we are going to try to simplify our analysis here, we must deal with
> the foundational issues. I take it that reflection, knowledge, and
> consciousness are different things. But when we consider things like
> Hayek's notion of "tacit knowledge" we run into a mixture of the three
> to some extent.
John, I wonder how you would fit your analysis into Mises's framework.
As you remind us, this debate seems to have been kicked off by
controversial passages in Chapter 1 of _Human Action_, which we referred
to in the Human Action Study Group. In other words, I wonder whether you
can find any defects, as Greg seems to, in Mises's treatment of the
equivalent of "reflection, knowledge, and consciousness." Or does your
treatment correspond to his. Tracy's analysis fits in where Mises points
out that "man emerges from his prehuman existence already as a social
being."(1966, Ch. 2, p. 43) Of course, if you think your analysis goes
beyond Mises or that Mises's discussion of these issues is inadequate or
incomplete, this would be inappropriate. Otherwise, it might be helpful.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 1997 09:31:58 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Pat:
As I said last time, Misesian analysis need not be at loggerheads
completely with Hayekian theories. We can indeed use Mises as a basis
and make marginal improvements. In my view it is a detraction from
Misesian advance to confound men and human action with animals. Let's
try the following:
1. Social science exists to explain and sometimes predict social
problems caused by individual human action. This is the object.
2. Men are capable of pursuing such inquiry since they have reflective
capacity, and because we take as given the axiom that all action is
purposeful.
3. Within this broad category of action we can improve the paradigm by
including at least 2 or maybe 3 categories of knowledge - conscious or
not - that men and scientists use to improve their state of affairs.
One is what is normally thought of a knowledge and the other is Hayekian
tacit knowledge.
4. Then we can consider institutions and how men find efficient means to
achieve their purposeful ends.
> can find any defects, as Greg seems to, in Mises's treatment of the
> equivalent of "reflection, knowledge, and consciousness." Or does your
> treatment correspond to his. Tracy's analysis fits in where Mises points
> out that "man emerges from his prehuman existence already as a social
> being."(1966, Ch. 2, p. 43)
The neo-Darwinian stuff is in my view, and obviously others on this
list, irrelevant. What matters is that men reflect and purpose and want
answers from science. I concur with much of what Tracy and Greg have
said, but the detraction into social biology is of negative value as I
have said.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 11:03:20 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
We are discussing hard things, and misunderstanding is not to
be unexpected when doing so. So I don't fault Pat for reading an
position into my remarks which i don't hold. I really DON'T
hold a continumm view of the relation between knowledge of what
Pat calls 'social biology' [not sure in any case what this is -- a
whole cluster of things i'd guess] and the explanation of the
undesigned order of the market. The confusion here might be caused
by what seems to be Pat's assumption that i think it if coherent
to construct what Pat calls a 'theory of conscious interaction' --
this is a picture from Mises that I reject as the basis of explaining
the undesigned order of the market. I.e. Pat is begging the question in
his characterization of the task, the problem, and of my own view of
the matter. I say this directly only to be clear. In the explanation
of the undersigned order of the market there are explanatory factors
that include a great many different human abilities and skills and ways
of doing -- some reflective (e.g. planning) and many not (routine
calculation is NOT reflective, for example -- also negatively constrained
rules of behavior are often followed WITHOUT reflectince, etc.). On
the primacy of automatic ways of doing things i might again recommend
reading some Wittgenstein, e.g. his _Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics_, or his _Philosophical Investigations_.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
http://members.aol.com/gregransom/hayekpage.htm
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 18:17:13 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Greg:
> that include a great many different human abilities and skills and ways
> of doing -- some reflective (e.g. planning) and many not (routine
> calculation is NOT reflective, for example -- also negatively constrained
> rules of behavior are often followed WITHOUT reflectince, etc.). On
I am not sure about this, as I noted in a previous post. I amy well be
that routine is simply the efficient institutionalization of some things
based on past reflection -- so it si ultimately reflective too.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
From: "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <rosserjb@jmu.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 14:29:32 -0500 ()
Well, I guess I'll buy into Greg's argument that there
is a spectrum here, but with the proviso that there can be
critical points on the spectrum, where, uh, dialectically
there can be a quantitative change leading to a qualitative
change, that is some very big changes in the nature of
consciousness or purposiveness, etc., if I haven't stepped
on too many toes with that "etc.", :-).
In any case I would note some serious evidence of
self-awareness, language ability, and purposiveness, at
least among "higher" primates. Thus, chimpanzees are
apparently able to recognize themselves in a mirror, in
contrast to, say, cats, who apparently think the image is
another cat.
I have just been reading a book from the library to my
seven-year old daughter, "Koko's Kitten" about a real life
situation where people in California are teaching gorillas
sign language. Koko knows about 500 words and appears to
have fairly substantive "conversations" with humans. The
book was about Koko wanting a cat after having had "Puss in
Boots" and "The Three Little Kittens" read to her. When
her cat died she expressed sorrow and was very happy to get
a new one. Well, one never knows what is really going on
here (there were some pretty convincing photos of Koko with
and without her cats in the book), but it sure looks like
at least some kind of "primitive" consciousness and
purposiveness, albeit at a much "lower" level than we homo
homo sapiens pride ourselves on exhibiting.
Barkley Rosser
On Tue, 4 Mar 1997 08:33:46 -0800 (PST) Fred Foldvary
<ffoldvar@jfku.edu> wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Mar 1997, John Cobin wrote:
>
> > > > Animals do not ponder reality present based
> > > > on what they know about the past in order to change.
> > >
> > > What's the evidence?
> >
> > I have none. I have never looked for any via a scientific test either.
> > Do you have evidence to believe that animals do act this way? Or do you
> > think it is reasonable or fair to assume that they do?
>
> I was only asking for the warrants for your assertions.
> Now my request for warrants has been challenged at its roots.
> I'll be very interested in finding the lack of warrant in calling
> for warranting, indeed. At any rate,
> I am not making any propositions about non-human animals here,
> hence I need no evidence.
> It is not evident or obvious to me from casual observation
> that animals do not reflect or ponder reality. The fact that
> dolphins seem to have an affinity to human beings and have
> helped them and not normally harmed them opens some questions.
>
> > > > In this sense,
> > > > they do not reflect. Reflection is a uniquely human phenomenon.
> > >
> > > Again, John, you assert this, but provide no warrants, i.e.
> > > no evidence or argument to justify it.
> >
> > Conceded. I am recalling from the past something I was taught. Now my
> > question is, if there is no evidence for this then why do some
> > philosophers teach this stuff?
>
> They, not the animals, have failed to reflect.
>
> > Is their claim baseless?
>
> It lacks evidence.
> But now I am told that evidence is not a scientific warrant!
> I'm willing to have my head turned upside down, but it will require
> a good argument - first as to how to do science in the first place.
>
> > So now Fred, I am all ears. Tell me your theory and don't just be a
> > doubting Thomas.
>
> But I *was* just being a doubting Thomas.
> I have no theory, but only a proposition, that there is a threshold
> beyond which the set of phenomena called {reflection, reason,
> awareness, pensience, sentience, etc.} endows a living being with
> qualities that make it a person, a being that basis its action
> on purposeful choice (if that antiquated notion still makes sense).
> As to what species fit the criteria for personhood, I have no
> special knowledge; I only ask for warrants for those who claim
> that non-human beings do not fit the criteria.
>
> > > > > Heck, some human beings may not be
> > > > > persons either, such as the permanently unconscious or zygotes.
> > > >
> > > > Levels of development are not a measure of humanity.
> > >
> > > Agreed; but my statement above refers to personhood, not humanity.
> >
> > Please clarify. Are you saying that a one year old is a human but not a
> > person? A zygote? The level of development does not affect personhood
> > either.
>
> I think it is reasonable to define as one criterion for personhood
> the existence of a functioning mind. In that case, a one-year-old
> human being is a person, but not a zygote. So the level of development
> does affect personhood; a person can also change into a non-person.
>
> > Normally, "person" is a legal term that is used to signify a human who
> > has natural rights that are recognized in law.
>
> So normally, law does recognize that we have natural rights?
> Is this a standard, common belief among legal scholars?
>
> > You might declare that a zygote, a moron, or even a one year old is not
> > a person based on some physical or developmental characteristic, but
> > this could only be in some legal sense. I will contend that they are
> > both humans and persons.
> >
> It is not a matter of declaring, but determining the meaning of
> concepts, and crafting definitions to fit those meanings, and
> then seeing what items fit the definitions.
> First we need to determine what personhood means.
> This is important for economics, since the class of agents
> studied consists of persons.
>
> Fred Foldvary
>
--
Rosser Jr, John Barkley
rosserjb@jmu.edu
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 18:20:58 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Rosser:
All these animal stories are starting to make this thread a bit inane.
Do animals really reflect and economize on data and other stuff in a
purposeful way that makes them proper objects for economic inquiry? Or
are these attributes unique to humans and thus form a key component of
our capacities and actions?
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
From: "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <rosserjb@jmu.edu>
To: AustrianECON@agoric.com
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 16:43:00 -0500 ()
John,
Well, there is by now a rather large literature on
experiments with animals, most of them of much "lower"
levels of intelligence, reflection, conscious
purposiveness, etc., that nevertheless shows them engaging
in at least elements of economizing behavior, including
even exhibiting downward-sloping demand curves, defined in
a broad way. I have some problems with that literature,
but it is quite extensive and growing. It might suggest
that "economizing" can occur without consciousness.
As for the inanity of the animal stories, well, I
don't know. I'm not sure what the agenda here is, as there
seems to be some sort of hidden one poking its head up in
this particular discussion. I have already made it clear
that I think there is good evidence for there being a
spectrum of
consciousness/intelligence/self-awareness/reflection/purposiveness
or whatever. I think we can see this within humans
ourselves with our continuous IQ measures that may
nevertheless be connected with discontinuous qualitative
differences among the intellectual capabilities and
functionings of different people. That there is not
unreasonable evidence of elements of conscious thought and
reflective memory (there is a lot of the latter in "Koko's
Kitten" that I did not describe in my previous post) going
well beyond the mere "affinity with humans" of dogs, etc.,
I see as simply reinforcing the general point already given.
Barkley Rosser
On Tue, 04 Mar 1997 18:20:58 -0400 John Cobin
<jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl> wrote:
> Rosser:
>
> All these animal stories are starting to make this thread a bit inane.
>
> Do animals really reflect and economize on data and other stuff in a
> purposeful way that makes them proper objects for economic inquiry? Or
> are these attributes unique to humans and thus form a key component of
> our capacities and actions?
>
> --
> John Cobin
> Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
> Universidad Finis Terrae
> Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
> Providencia, Santiago, Chile
> fono +56-2-274-8084
> fax +56-2-209-4135
> jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
--
Rosser Jr, John Barkley
rosserjb@jmu.edu
From: ETCHISON.GC@EMAIL.PUC.TEXAS.GOV (GC-Etchison, Michael)
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 15:46 CST
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
John Cobin 3/4 asks:
> Do animals really reflect and economize on data and other stuff in a
purposeful way that makes them proper objects for economic inquiry? Or
are these attributes unique to humans and thus form a key component of
our capacities and actions?
Is anyone out there wanting to do The Economic Life of Squirrels? If
not, what difference does it make whether "person" or "consciousness" or
"intention" is defined in such a way as to include/exclude squirrels or
fetuses or tornadoes? For that matter, what economic principle requires
that "conscious" be defined _for all purposes_ so as to include/be
identical to/exclude "purposeful"? I agree that Actor A's decision to
buy X instead of Y may have rested on a set of
impulses/reasons/principles which vary widely in explicitness, coherence,
and calculability. I agree that a model which speaks of that decision as
a "purposeful" "action" may not square with our ordinary usage of those
words. I would suggest only that our efforts might better be directed
toward making our definitions-for-this-purpose explicit, rather than in
wrangling about first principles and "real" definitions and so forth.
Michael Etchison
[opinions mine, not the PUCT's]
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 13:55:30 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
I don't associate 'Austrian economics' exclusively
with Mises's 'praxeology' or his 'action axiom' -- in
fact i think Austrain economics is better off without
much of this Misesian stuff. The difficulty is that so
much of what is most valuable in Mises is articulated
in a mish-mash of languages -- much of it contaminated by
what i don't see as either necessary or sound, i.e.
a good deal of his discussion of 'praxeology' and his
effort to ground economics on his so-called 'action axiom'.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 13:57:58 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
It is also worth mentioning that bono bono chimps (sp?)
have been observed to exchange fruit for sex (the 'oldest
profession'). Truck and barter has also occured in
the interactions between humans and some of the higher
primates. So even Smith's famous criteria doesn't offer
a clear cut demarcation between men and other primates.
greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 19:26:23 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
OK Greg, so then are we going to elevate some animal actions to the
level of human action as purposeful and reflective and thus a proper
object of economic analysis? Or are we simply saying that man acts just
a bit more rationally and reflectively and purposefully than animals?
Frankily, despite all these scientific observations that have been
noted, I have serious doubts about the credibility of claims that
animals have such capacities or tendencies. Human action differs from
animal action. But from what you say it does not so much(?). So tell
me, what makes humans different and dominant and reflective and whatever
else? We are after all different from animals in many ways: war,
relationships, scholarship, etc. I am still satisfied that reflection
is the qualitative difference that makes human action purposeful. I am
not sure where your reasoning is leading other than to make a pitch for
chucking old-fashioned and Aristotelian modes of viewing the nature of
man.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 14:01:38 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
I don't think John that definitions are what we usually
rely on for the appropriate use of language .. much of this
is automatic, and in fact definitions are secondary to
automatic & embodied ways of doing things, of using language.
Paradigm examples are even primary over constructed definitions.
Again on all this (for those who want to check out the
alternative) i would recommend the work of Wittgenstein & Kuhn.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 14:08:19 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Gordon Tullock has applied the utility calculus to ants -- he
totally anthropomorphizes these ants, and finds them completely
appropriate 'objects for economic inquiry'. To repeat, i think this
notion of the 'proper object of economic inquiry' is completely
mistaken -- a mistake tracable back to Weber and his influence on Mises --
which moved to London and Chicago in the persons of Robbins, Becker,
and others. The individual is NOT the explanatory problem in economics,
contrary to the mistake picture of so much of the currenct economics
profession -- undesigned order in society raises the empirical/scientific
problem to be explained. Sciences are identifiable in terms of
PROBLEMs, not domains or objects -- Popper and Hayek are very helpful
on this (as is Kuhn and others). Mises, under the influence of
Weber, has miss characterized the problem and task of economics -- and
the influence of this mistake is everywhere to be seen in contemporary
economics, found in Samuelson, Becker, Buchanan, and hundreds of
others.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 14:28:19 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
On Tue, 4 Mar 1997, John Cobin wrote:
> Fred:
> > I am not making any propositions about non-human animals here,
> > hence I need no evidence.
>
> So then you will not contend that animals can reflect? You will be
> agnostic on this point? You point is just that we cannot say because we
> cannot know?
I don't claim we cannot know; I only said you have no warrant for
your own statement. As I said, I am not making any propositions
here on the abilities of non-human animals.
> > It is not evident or obvious to me from casual observation
> > that animals do not reflect or ponder reality. The fact that
> > dolphins seem to have an affinity to human beings and have
> > helped them and not normally harmed them opens some questions.
>
> Have you been watching those Jaques Cousteau nature shows lately? Dogs
> interact with humans too. So do all animals at some level. The fact
> that some show "affinity" hardly means much does it? Is that how you
> want to judge whether an animal can reflect?
I don't know how much affinity means, and what it implies for reflection.
I'm only pointing out possibilities for purposeful action and
reflection among non-human animals, as others here have indicated for
elephants and primates.
> > They, not the animals, have failed to reflect.
>
> This is a little funny but very doubtful to me. You have just tried to
> overturn a widespread belief with a joke. They are scholars, and the
> least we can do until we see evidence to the contrary is to believe that
> they have some logical or empirical rationale backing their statements.
I have read the proposition by philosophers and social scientists
often that animals cannot reason, reflect, be self-aware, act
purposively rather than by instinct, etc. Theologians or religious
writers make such claims frequently also. But I have never read
any warrant - argument, evidence - for such propositions.
It is always asserted. So I say, seriously, do these writers
reflect on this or regurgitate what others have said?
I can't believe they have logical or empirical rationale if they
don't provide it or point to it.
> Have you evidence of animals reflecting?
Yes, my own reflection. Beyond that I only have interpretive
understanding (Verstehen). This is more warranted for human
beings than for other animals, since they are more like me, but
lack of warrants does itself not warrant opposite conclusions.
> Are you just doubting for the
> sake of doubting?
I am not even doubting, but only pointing out the lack of warrants.
To doubt is to disbelieve, and I do not disbelieve.
Suppose you tell me you believe there are aliens from beyond earth
living among us.
In asking for a warrant - how do you know - I would only be
truly skeptical - neither believe nor disbelieve without warrants.
> If you have no good reason to reject the theories on
> reflection then why not accept them like we do for so many other things
> in life?
We? As Tonto said to the Lone Ranger when he said "Oh oh, we are
surrounded by Indians!": "What do you mean, WE, white man?"
Without good reason, the skeptic neither accepts nor rejects.
And in science, we should be skeptics.
> Furthermore, let's consider a newborn, say 1
> minute old. Does he/she have "the existence of a functioning mind" more
> than he/she did 2 minutes ago? I think not. So your arbitrary
> distinction is not very credible.
The conclusion does not follow, because the baby has a functioning
mind prior to birth. Embryologists observe the development of a
brain that controls the body around the 4th month or so.
Birth radically affects breathing, not the brain.
> Moreover, does a newborn display "purposeful" human action and things
> like the capacity to reflect in sufficient measure (1) to be considered
> objects for economic analysis and (2) a person? Would you say that a
> dolphin displays more affinity than a newborn?
I have insufficient data to answer these questions.
> your
> statements read more like declarations than determinations from reason.
That statement is unwarranted without textual evidence or example.
Fred Foldvary
From: ETCHISON.GC@EMAIL.PUC.TEXAS.GOV (GC-Etchison, Michael)
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 16:45 CST
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Could it be that Greg Ransom and I agree? He writes 3/4 that it is
possible to do the Economic Life of, if not squirrels, Ants (and if
Gordon Tullock can do it, that's good enough for me). He adds that
"notion of the 'proper object of economic inquiry' is completely
mistaken." So far we are two for two. He goes on to say that undesigned
order is the problem; I might note that Oliver Williamson says there is
often much to be gained by focussing on the transaction, but add that I
find Williamson surprisingly insensitive to the relevance of Hayek et al.
to his theories, and would probably seek some melding of undesigned order
and transaction.
Would Ransom think Williamson and Mises too alike on this? To forestall
that, I point out that, to Williamson, a focus on transactions is
appropriate precisely in order to understand the origin and behavior of
institutions. (Williamson deals mostly with fairly narrow-scope
institutions, e.g., why is this company's capital structure tilted toward
equity?, but he acknowledges that transaction-focussed analysis is also
relevant to larger-scope institutions, such as Douglass North et al.
study. Undesigned, or at least incompletely-designed, institutions are
very much at the heart of North's work.) The parties to a transaction
are at least to some extent making explicit and "designing" some elements
of the transaction, and of the consequent institution, but it is far less
likely a) that they conceive themselves to be (or claim to be) acting
with an eye to larger-scale institutions ("order," in Hayekian terms) or
b) that we should credit them for that (other than possibly for good --
or bad - intentions).
Michael Etchison
[opinions mine, not the PUCT's]
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 00:16:53 +0800
From: Patrick Gunning <gunning@stsvr.showtower.com.tw>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
In one of his most recent posts, John Cobin seems to make a persuasive
case to continue with this thread. As I interpret his remarks, he says
that it is necessary to deal with challenges to Mises's claim that there
is a fundamental and "sharp" distinction between purposeful, or
conscious, action and other behavior. Unless we do, he says, our studies
of the market economy and market intervention will we subject to the
criticism that we have not identified the entities for whom our studies
are relevant. Thus, he seems to conclude, the issues raised by Greg and
Tracy are fundamental.
In considering this issue, we might recall that Mises began his book by
noting that Richard Cantillon, David Hume, and Adam Smith had introduced
a new kind of knowledge, or perhaps a new means of looking at the
interaction (or interbehavior) they had observed in everyday life. Greg,
referring to Darwin perhaps, would suggest that we could think of this
knowledge as part of a continuum with knowledge of social biology. There
is no sharp line between a theory of conscious interaction, which Mises
presumably had in mind in speaking of the above authors, and unconscious
behavior, which Hayek had in mind in speaking of the the rules by which
people live without being conscious of them. Hayek would perhaps have
interpreted the above authors in a different way.
Perhaps support for Mises's claim of the need for (or existence of) a
sharp distinction is that to comprehend both interaction and
interbehavior, we must use methodological individualism. We must begin
with a theory of the individual. If we adopt this view, then the focus
shifts inward. We are led to reflect on our own being. When I do this, I
see a very clear distinction between conscious and unconscious. I am
afraid of my unconscious behavior and try to identify it so that I can
consciously control it. (For example, I don't want to burden the list
with FLAMES just because a critic's remarks seem insulting. So I pour a
drink, have a smoke, or down a muscle relaxant before responding. And I
try to choose my words carefully.) Inward reflection makes this
distinction clear and sharp.
Now I turn back to the problem of explaining the observed behavior of
others like myself. Recalling my view of myself, it seems quite natural
to assume that the others (1) may or (2) may not be conscious of their
behavior -- that, in this sense, they may or may not be purposeful.
Given that I can make either assumption, I decide to carve out a field
of study that is concerned entirely with this conscious behavior.
Consistent with my decision to focus on this field, I require all of the
imaginary constructs that I plan to use in directly understanding
behavior to contain individuals who are _always_ conscious, purposeful
actors. Of course, I know that this assumption is not realistic for
every biologically human being. I myself was once a baby. I also know
that even _I_ perform unconscious behavior. Accordingly I know that I
could just as well have carved out another field of study on the basis
of the assumption that others are not conscious of their behavior. But I
leave this field to, well, the social biologists. At the same time, I
keep in mind that when I turn to the problem of interpreting everyday
life, I must employ knowledge from both fields.
Now the question is: is my reasoning sound? Is methodoligical
individualism a strong enough foundation to base my reasoning on? Enter
Tracy's earlier reference to Munz and the significance of language.
Practically everyone who has studied the emergence of the ego has
concluded that it could not emerge in the absence of other human beings.
Would the boy raised by wolves have an ego? Presumably, but it would be
a very different ego than that of a human being who learns, through
"interaction" that he is, on the one hand, like his cohorts but, on the
other hand, different from them. And, at least within the era of the
human history that interests us most, the "interaction" that is
necessary for the emergence of the ego is accompanied by language. It is
partly language interaction. Indeed, we can interpret language broadly
enough that interaction is itself impossible without language.
A new question arises. Does the observable fact that people learn about
their ego through interaction involving language challenge the
methodological individualistic foundation of the theory of purposeful,
conscious action that we have so thoughtfully carved out? Let me return
to the process of reflecting on myself which led me to perceive such a
clear disctinction between the conscious and the subconscious. Suppose
that in this state of self-reflection, I try to take account of the fact
that my ability to even conceive of myself is, in some sense, a product
of "interaction" based on language. Will this compromise my later
decision to carve out a field of study based on purposeful, conscious
action?
Let me end this post with two possible ways that we might try to answer
this question. First, might seek an answer by exploring the
"interaction" and language that necessarily preceded the emergence of my
ego. Can we conceive of interaction and language "education" that would
lead to the emergence of an ego which, when it reflected on itself,
would not recognize a clear and sharp distinction between the conscious
and the unconscious? Second, perhaps we can discover in the
"interaction" and language some reason to believe that individuals who
reflected on themselves and reached the conclusion that there was a
sharp distinction between the conscious and the subconscious were
suffering from an illusion and confused.
Whoops, one more idea. Keep in mind that it is our ego that is doing
the questioning and answering here!
Well, this is as far as I can go tonight. As my old philosophy professor
used to say, if tomorrow is more sunny, I might change my mind.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 17:27:59 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Pat:
If we are going to try to simplify our analysis here, we must deal with
the foundational issues. I take it that reflection, knowledge, and
consciousness are different things. But when we consider things like
Hayek's notion of "tacit knowledge" we run into a mixture of the three
to some extent. Humans do act purposefully but sometimes their action
is not "conscious" but is tacit -- it is automaically generated by
mechanisms produced by reflection and stored knowledge --
institutionalized behaviour we might say.
If we want to deal with robots or maybe even Crusoes our analysis is
easier. One of the harder parts of economics -- the part which is of
such interest to Austrians -- is this other fuzzy stuff that seems more
realistic and maybe more powerful.
Again, who or what can act purposefully and what constitutes such
action?
Your input about language is etremely important it seems to me. So what
are the implications? Can we say that language is a third category of
knowledge -- neither tacit nor ordinary -- that helps men act
purposefully? If so, can we grade that knowledge even to the point of
saying that one language is superior to others in helping men remove
uneasiness in an Hayekian evolutionary sense? Are there other
implications?
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 1997 21:45:39 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
John Cobin wrote:
>
> Pat:
> Can we say that language is a third category of
> knowledge -- neither tacit nor ordinary -- that helps men act
> purposefully? If so, can we grade that knowledge even to the point of
> saying that one language is superior to others in helping men remove
> uneasiness in an Hayekian evolutionary sense? Are there other
> implications?
John, as you probably know, I raised the language question mainly
because I wanted to acknowledge Tracy's concern about language as
preceding the emergence of the ego and therefore the emergence of any
notion of conscious and unconscious, or purpose in the behavior in the
developing child.
As for my own view, I have no doubt that, for the normal human being,
language precedes the development of the ego as well as the development
of what some psychologists have called "formal thought." However, the
fact that language precedes ego development or, pushed to the extreme,
is necessary for that development; does not mean that language is a
fundamental cause of the ego or that the ego's properties depend in a
fundamental way on language. An alternative hypothesis is that the
emergence of the ego is a developmental process for which language is an
essential catalyst but nevertheless does not itself play an important
part in the ego. A third hypothesis is that, although language is
essential in the development of the ego and is a major contributor in
its initial character, once the ego is developed, each human being has
the capacity, in some measure if not totally, "to think away the
influence of language." A person may, in most of her everyday
activities, behave in a way that the psychologist or sociologist would
interpret as being almost entirely under the influence of the particular
language group of which she is a member. Yet, when she sets her mind to
it, she can behave in a way that would lead the psychologist to
interpret her behavior as not being significantly influenced by
language. If this third hypothesis is correct, the conscientious
psychologist and sociologist would presumably want to account for both
possibilities to correctly interpret what he studies.
There is an interesting debate between Jean Piaget, who carefully and
meticulously studied the development of fundamental concepts in children
of various ages, and Noam Chomsky, the renowned linguist, who studied
the structure of languages. A friend just lent me the book that contains
both the debate and comments by other "experts" but I haven't yet read
it. I pretty much know that Piaget will assert that language is a
catalyst while I expect Chomsky to take the view that language is a
fundamental contributor to the development of thought.
In other work, Piaget has argued that in the study of the development
of human thought, the proper method is what he calls "parallelism."
Maybe dualism would be an equivalent term. First, one must assume that
development proceeds largely according to fixed rules due to the
inherent nature of the human development process. In other words,
development of thought occurs in pretty much the same way as the
development of the human body. On the other hand, we must assume that
inherent in the human being is an ability to modify the development once
she reaches a certain stage. In other words, we must assume that she can
alter her thought patterns in a way that corresponds to the common sense
use of the term "intentional."
I have read many of Piaget's other works. Although aspects of his
research and conclusions have been criticized for a variety of reasons,
I find his parallelism convincing. I see it as a "scientific"
vindication of the action axiom as the foundation for a unique type of
knowledge - - praxeology. Perhaps my viewpoint is not surprising since I
studied Piaget first. Of course, one can, like Mises, argue for the
action axiom from one's sense of self. But it is comforting to me to
know that such a brilliant and productive scientist as Piaget felt that
he had to assume something like the action axiom in order to adequately
comprehend the unfolding of human thought.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
From: ETCHISON.GC@EMAIL.PUC.TEXAS.GOV (GC-Etchison, Michael)
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 15:36 CST
Subject: RE: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
Tracy Harms apologizes 3/3 for thinking Greg Ransom was ill-tempered. He
quotes an earlier post from Ransom. And then says he looks forward to
looking at the Michael Behe bok I mentioned. So I clarify a bit:
My problem with Greg is not that he's intent on seeing evolution as a
useful tool for understanding economic theory and/or activity.
Unfortunately, his argument is
1. Man evolved from slime, with no design
2. As science has conclusively shown, in more than enough detail, so
3. Anyone who fails to understand that economics is evolutionary is
Unscientific.
Of course, 3 does not follow from 2, if only because there's more than
one kind of science. My difficulty, however, is that 2 is at least
doubtful, but, even more important, both 1 and 2 are entirely irrelevant
to whether an evolutionary model is useful in either doing or
understanding economics. In his enthusiasm for both economics and
conventional cutting-edge neo-Darwinism, he conflates the two and
believes that anyone who either does not "understand" CCEND or doesn't
buy it is unscientific and therefore unable/unqualified to understand,
let alone do, economics.
Even the rankest Young-Earth fundamentalist (of whom I am not one) has
no difficulty understanding dog breeding as an "evolutionary" activity.
I don't see why he would be unable to understand the unintended
consequences/evolution take on economics. To assert that the existing
species were individually created by a sentient Creator is not
incompatible with an explanatory scheme in which economic institutions
originate and change notwithstanding the absence of a Planner. All of
the tinkering with Darwinism and post-/etc.-Darwinism would be highly
useful heuristically in economics (practice and methodology), whether or
not they were useful in understanding long-term biology.
Michael Etchison
[opinions mine, not the PUCT's]
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 1997 19:17:53 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
I appreciate Michael's point, although I might be a bit less critical of
Greg.
You or I may not agree with Gregs neo-Darwinian sentiments but that is
his paradigm in which he chooses to analyze things. Maybe I missed
something but I did not read Greg as dismissing any of us who are not
hard-care neo-Darwinians or something.
Michael is of course right that such views are irrelevant to doing
economics. One can be a Creationist and still be scientific. It is
even possible to accept evolutionary themes in a Hayekian sense while
maintaining a creationist or at least non-neo-Darwinian posture.
If Greg ever makes a bold assertion to the contrary then we can
vituperate him, but at this point he is simply approaching this problem
from his perspective and with the tools he has acquired.
All perspectives can be valuable and shunning one for the sake of purity
is precarious to say the least.
Likewise, Michael's criticism of neo-Darwinist tendencies is valuable in
the sense that he reminds us that we can understand reality by other
means.
> My problem with Greg is not that he's intent on seeing evolution as a
> useful tool for understanding economic theory and/or activity.
> Unfortunately, his argument is
Caterpillars evolve into butterflies -- we can observe that. Whether
men evolve from slime cannot be repeated and observed so it is a much
weaker conjecture. But some can hold to it and still do science. And
in either case evolution can be part of our scientific inquiry -- it
just depends on how we define evolution. As far as I am concerned,
although I am sure of the Darwinist tendencies of hayek and other
Austrians, all that is needed to make Hayekian theory useful is
acceptance of the former variety of evolution or micro-evolution.
> consequences/evolution take on economics. To assert that the existing
> species were individually created by a sentient Creator is not
> incompatible with an explanatory scheme in which economic institutions
Right.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 17:03:19 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Subject: RE: action, reflection, tension between frameworks
Michael has misunderstood my views on economics, and especially
on my views of the rather complex relationships between Darwinian
and others sciences and economics. I really do think that
economics provides rather autonomous knowledge -- but in my view
the most robust and plausible knowledge provided in economics
comes in a form most fully consistent with modern advancements in
our understanding of logic and language (in the first instance)
and in epistemology and biology and psychology (in the second instance)
-- all sorts of background understanding can come into play in our
judgement of the robustness of alternative explanatory endovours. on
this issues i'd particularly recommend T. Kuhn, _The Copernican
Revolution_, which provides a nice example of this basic fact that
often goes ignored.
Greg Ransom
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
http://members.aol.com/gregransom/hayekpage.htm
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 22:32:27 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Count me among those who find the general study of animals remote from the
study of economics. In its way, though, I'd say the flurry of discussion
over animal intelligence really slams home one of my major points:
Attention to a *criterion* by which reflective intention can be identified
leads to distraction. It naturally provokes these debates regarding
non-humans and non-advanced humans, but none of that is relevant to the
field of economics, at least not in any major way.
For me this part of the matter is straightforward: Economic consideration
is effectively limited to humans, for there is something extraordinary
about the reflection (lets call it) found among humans. This extraordinary
difference is not a matter of humans being soley intelligent, nor soley
purposeful, nor soley conscious. These qualities are not the monopoly of
humanity. In saying that economic consideration is effectively limited to
humans I mean merely that economic study can adequately progress by
considering the human realm alone, as it has traditionally done. I expect
that it does apply to examples beyond human society, but -- so what? Every
field of study works on certain *classes of problems*, and when the
resulting solutions are good they apply wherever such patterns arise.
Hayek spoke to why economics has tended to be confused regarding its
subject matter, and why it mistakenly tends to emphasize the mentality of
the economizing individual. Economics has its roots in the study of *how
to better economize?* (as is still the case for 'home economics'), and it
has not always kept that distinct from the question of *what patterns of
organization result from individual attempts at economizing?* As Greg just
put it, "undesigned order in society raises the empirical/scientific
problem to be explained."
Mises was very right to emphasize that the subjective theory of value
produces an explanation for costs (e.g. prices) as the consequence of
specific demands by specific agents for specific goods, in contrast with
the failure of competing views which attempt to explain by analysis of
aggregates. Mises was correct to see that said subjectivism implies that
theoretical social science "is independent of all psychological and ethical
considerations" (_Grundprobleme_, as quoted p72 of Cubeddu 1993). But it
just so happens that in the marketplace instances of valuation are most
obvious in regard to designing states of mind, and Mises erred in
attempting to stake out praxeology by reference to a mental quality in the
constitutive individuals. This is a vestige of psychological attribution
which contradicts Mises' own insight, and should be discarded.
Consider: The remarkable human capacity to form deliberate ends is not
itself of deliberate origin. This, too, is a spontaneous order. The
nature of this order precludes thinking of it as a substance, essence, or
property within individuals; it emerges in individuals, but it arises from
diverse features which cross-cut single actors and their personal minds.
Therefore while economics does properly deal with the social consequences
of the deliberations of reflective individuals, we can -- we *must* -- work
with this deliberation and reflection without attempting to give it
psychological identity.
If this is sound we should continue to endorse the idea of rational actors,
but we should approach their rationality not as an isolate quality, but as
involvement in an ecology. The ecology of intellect is primarily the
unintended consequence of propositional language. What distinguishes
deliberate, reflective mind (and thus, anticipatory economizing) is
propositional language and the conceptual consequences it produces in
thinkers.
Having just indicated who rational actors are, nevertheless I disagree with
John that "we need to determine who can reflect or act purposefully before
we can proceed with further economic inquiry." We can build economic
inquiry around a general confidence that at least some individuals are
actors in the economic sense, and that at least some of their actions
likewise qualify. We need not specify how to sort either; we need not
concern ourselves with the haziness of the boundaries involved. Economic
inquiry does enough to attempt to state economic facts. E.g. insofar as
supply is recognized as decreasing relative to demand, bidding will tend to
drive the price higher. This "insofar as" qualifies the claim within the
limits of the economic field, but we need not have unequivocal criteria for
the edges, nor need we successfully sort arbitrarily given instances. It
is sufficient if (1) there are economic realities, (2) we come up with
truthful understandings of them, and (3) we find circumstances where these
ideas apply often enough.
John asks: "Again, who or what can act purposefully and what constitutes such
action?" As Fred said, the class of agents studied by economics consists
of persons -- but that just provides a label. I think good economic theory
asserts that persons are members of a community wherein economic concepts
apply, and that economizing occurs in the application of those concepts by
those persons. The importance of the role of language is that it allows
concepts to be formed, and it allows conflicting concepts to be compared.
Awareness of the importance of tacit knowledge should make us wary against
imagining that it is the actual acts of conceptualizing which count. The
intellectualizing is a *catalyst* which alters the wider inclinations
(purposes) of the individuals. That the act of 'thinking' is not
definitive is perhaps most clear when we notice that a conceptual change
may provoke a change in the market inclinations of *a different person*.
Indeed the price system is efficient precisely because it facilitates such
*thoughtlessness*: Potential buyers are free to react viscerally to prices
which are higher or lower than their expectations. No word-processing is
required of them, yet their participation in the cultural whole of the
market process makes this human action, nevertheless.
Tracy Bruce Harms
harms@hackvan.com
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 1997 16:20:48 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
T. B. Harms wrote:
> Mises was correct to see that said subjectivism implies that
> theoretical social science "is independent of all psychological and ethical
> considerations" (_Grundprobleme_, as quoted p72 of Cubeddu 1993). But it
> just so happens that in the marketplace instances of valuation are most
> obvious in regard to designing states of mind, and Mises erred in
> attempting to stake out praxeology by reference to a mental quality in the
> constitutive individuals. This is a vestige of psychological attribution
> which contradicts Mises' own insight, and should be discarded.
I assume, Tracy, that you mean by these remarks that all behavior of
human beings lies along a continuum and that because valuation is most
obvious in the marketplace, conscious, or purposeful (in Mises's words),
behavior is also most evident there. But the fact that it is most
evident there is not a sufficient reason to construct a field of
knowledge based on the assumption that all behavior is conscious, or
purposeful. So when Mises works back from economics based on the
assumption that all behavior is conscious, or purposeful, to a general
theory of action, he erred. He also presumably erred in making economic
theory only a theory of conscious, purposeful action.
To err, one must have a end in mind. Error implies that other, more
suitable means are available to achieve a particular end. I wonder if
you would state the end that you believe Mises was, or should have been,
aiming to achieve. I don't think that your post told us this. For
example, you might answer that his end was to construct economic theory.
But then I would ask why did he want to construct economic theory. This
might give us some insight on whether he wanted to construct an economic
theory in the same sense as "neoclassical economics."
What I am getting at is this. I am wondering whether we can find a
justification for a clear and distinct difference between conscious and
unconscious action based on the aim that Mises wanted to achieve in
economics and praxeology.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 1997 09:57:17 -0400
From: John Cobin <jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl>
Subject: Re: conscious versus purposeful action
Tracy's recent long post was quite helpful. Maybe we could have avoided
this whole thread by using adjectives more carefully to begin with.
Humans have *extraordinary* reflective capacity and are the only things
important in economic inquiry. We can also label them persons and avoid
a lot of the marginal issues. They are important to be sure but can be
avoided for the sake of pursuing the scientific endeavor. Also imprtant
as Tracy notes are the roles of culture and spontaneous action.
I might also add tangentially that such unplanned or undesigned action
at the basis can have a neo-Darwinian, theologicial, or other
perspective to educate it. Maybe it comes from basic instincts, maybe
genes transmit accumulated knowledge, maybe God puts original thoughts
in men as the Prime Mover. Whatever one will accept of these or other
perspectives, we can still all procede to do economic analysis from
there. That's why in AE you find such a wide variety of world views
having some common ground.
Mises himself ends up noting late in HA that he has not solved the
problem or question of why humans act purposefully and continue to try
to remove uneasiness, instead of choosing death or whatever. We all
need to answer that issue based on one of the forgoing world views.
> Therefore while economics does properly deal with the social consequences
> of the deliberations of reflective individuals, we can -- we *must* -- work
> with this deliberation and reflection without attempting to give it
> psychological identity.
That's fine.
> but we should approach their rationality not as an isolate quality, but as
> involvement in an ecology. The ecology of intellect is primarily the
> unintended consequence of propositional language. What distinguishes
> deliberate, reflective mind (and thus, anticipatory economizing) is
> propositional language and the conceptual consequences it produces in
> thinkers.
Very good.
> Having just indicated who rational actors are, nevertheless I disagree with
> John that "we need to determine who can reflect or act purposefully before
> we can proceed with further economic inquiry." We can build economic
> inquiry around a general confidence that at least some individuals are
> actors in the economic sense, and that at least some of their actions
> likewise qualify. We need not specify how to sort either; we need not
> concern ourselves with the haziness of the boundaries involved.
This is weak, and in effect all you have said is we need to do what John
says but we have to use more qualification in the way we say it. You
still agree that we have to identify objects for inquiry you just don't
think we need to make generalized statements for modelling. SOmewhere
in that hazy mass of humanity -- nat animals as you said -- we find the
object for our inquiry.
> It
> is sufficient if (1) there are economic realities, (2) we come up with
> truthful understandings of them, and (3) we find circumstances where these
> ideas apply often enough.
OK, and this is a fair philosophical basis for my list in the last post.
--
John Cobin
Profesor de Economia y Politica Publica
Universidad Finis Terrae
Av. Pedro de Valdivia 1543
Providencia, Santiago, Chile
fono +56-2-274-8084
fax +56-2-209-4135
jcobin@paki.ufinis.cl